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Three
The Axiological Tum in Early Twentieth Century
American Philosophy: Alain Locke and Jose
Vasconcelos on Epistemology, Value, and the
Emotions
Grant Silva
Alain Locke (1885- 1954) and Jose Vasconcelos (1882-1959) are philosophical
anthropologists.' Philosophical anthropology is the study of the anrhropos from
a perspective that not only relies upon history, society, culture, biology and abstract thought, such that humans are believed to be the producers and products of
the relations hip between these, but philosophical anthropology attempts to formulate holistic understandings of the human as a complex being whose selfimage is part of its own constitution and growth. The possibility of growth, in
conjunction with the plasticity of human nature, forces a philosophical anthropologist to explore the subjective dimensions of these pote ntialities. 2 Thus, philosophical anthropology engages the rational aspects of the human mind, the
historical dimensions of society and culture, in addition to subjective elements
of experience (suc h as the emotions, values and feelings) in order to arrive at a
complete understanding of the human. In this light, the philosophicoanthropological work of Locke and Vasconcelos can be viewed as responding to
the positive science and anthropology of the late ninetenth and early twentieth
centuries.3 In particular, Locke's work takes on the racialist biology of his day
and the inadequate theories of value in his time. It is my contention that he ex31
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plores the latter to resolve several issues in the former, or at least this is one way
of viewing the relationship between Locke's axiology and racial theory. Vasconcelos's work attempts to unsettle the main tenants ofComtean-inspired Latin
American positivism, which abandoned metaphysical intellectual pursuits for a
social philosophy that advocated educational reform, mechanical industrialization and foreign investment, all on a social-Darwinist account of progress.
The fields of study that Locke and Vasconcelos are responding to and invested in owe much to the invention of modem science. 4 At first, "modem" or
"modernity" is a term that designates a period of time in human history and affairs, i.e. that pertaining to Western Europe at some point after the medieval
ages, the Italian Renaissance and the colonization of America (right through to
the Enlightenment). European colonial projects must be mentioned in this regard
since the contact with various peoples in different parts of the world provided
the perspective that made possible the separation of the "modem" from the "savage," "pre-modem," "medieval" and (subsequently) "post-modem ."~ Once
aware of their progress, the further accumulation of human knowledge became
the primary goal subsequent thinkers. "Modernity" thus transformed from a period of time to a stage in human history, an idea that incorporates and depends
upon a developmental historicist attitude and the hierarchical categorization of
humanity as a whole.
The first section of this essay provides a historical account for what I will
call "the humanism of modem reason." While providing novel takes on method
and analysis, the epistemological criteria established by philosophers like Rene
Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Auguste Comte constructed a humanism privileging the rational enlightened subject. Concerned with explaining observable
fact, the scientific and philosophical thought of the modem era disregarded the
normative import of values, emotion or feelings. Philosophers viewed these as
the by-product of the passions, inclination or simple irrational impulse; they
were not a source for scientific knowledge on account of their relative nature
and tendency to serve as impediments to objectivity. It is within the positive
philosophy of late ninetenth century that a stage theory of human development
became synonymous with modem scientific advancement. The anthropology of
the same era later "naturalized" the differences between people through the idea
of race. ''Progress" (or lack thereof) became fixed to the behavior patterns assumed to be part of an individual's personal and cultural existence.
Locke's axiology and social theory are the subjects of the second section.
Influenced by European axiologists and American pragmatists, his views provide an alternative to the value theories of his era, given that Locke is critical of
positivist and pragmatist understandings of value. In addition, the social dimensions of value cannot be dismissed by fears of relativism, if anything studying
values in Locke's nuanced manner provides the epistemological tools necessary
for understanding human cultural differences. Vasconcelos's criticism of rationalist philosophy and his ideas on metaphysics constitute the third section. Con-
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sidered a "non-rationalist," Vasconcelos's philosophical system responds to Latin American positivism which put forth "order and progress" over and against
metaphysical abstraction. As Vasconcelos contends, this eliminated the importance of aesthetics and values, an act that undermines crucial ways in which humans interpret the world. Bringing the two together in a way that offers some
interesting insights into the philosophical study of the human, besides also
showing how Locke can lend a hand to Vasconcelos's ideas on race, the last
section (four) concludes this essay by presenting the consequences of these
American axiological explorations upon human culture and society.
In light of (I) the dismissive attitude towards feeling and emotions, (2) the
humanism of modem reason and (3) the creation of progress-oriented sciences,
this essay suggests that the works of Locke and Vasconcelos constitute an "axiological tum" in American philosophy. These individuals articulate alternative
humanisms that assuage cultural differences, disabuse past acts of domination
and cultural prejudice while also reflecting the variety of human ways of knowing. Besides the erudite and scholastic reasoning that motivates their ideas, these
thinkers attempt to improve human understandings of value and aesthetics for
the sake of ameliorating social/cultural relations and what Vasconcelos caJis
"spiritual" life. Both Locke and Vasconcelos believe that human feelings and
emotions are inherently connected to the production of knowledge. Any adequate understanding of human ways of knowing must explore these aspects of

the mind and not disregard them as too subjective or relative.

The Humanism of Modern Reason
Although metaphysical treatises are abundant in modem thought, theory of
knowledge or epistemology plays a central role in this tradition. One possible
reason for this depends upon a defining characteristic of modernity: the concern
with and supposed awareness of human progress. In this framework the development of scientific knowledge became linked to the study of knowledge itself.
The assumption here is that improvements to the enterprise of the acquisition of
knowledge would entail that the products of these pursuits become more "certain." However, improving epistemological standards for inquiry necessitated a
restructuring of the subject enacting these philosophical and scientific analyses.
Seeing how this meant that the subject was to become part of inquiry, the
science of modernity articulated a theory of humanity (a self-reflective examination) as connected to the furtherance of knowledge. One of the implicit goals of
the modem project, when viewed as a whole, is the creation of a humanism
grounded upon reason or rationality .6 This understanding of the human being in
tum became the yardstick for comparing the cultures of the world and the foundation for the sciences that explained these differences in the first place.
As held by many Latin American philosophers, the origins of modernityor, if one chooses, the catalyst that brought modernity into its full fruition-is
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the encounter with America. 7 From the latin American perspective, "reason"
serves as the last bastion for a worldview that encountered a land mass not recorded in its main text (the Bible) or acknowledged by papaVfeudal institutions.
Put differently, reason is where modem philos·ophers turned when attempting to
formulate novel foundations for knowledge when dofma, revealed religion or
the passions and inclination could no longer be trusted.
Two pivotal texts that correspond to two main phases of modernity are Descartes' Discourse on Method and Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?" Written at the end of the Scholastic age, Descartes' Discourse articulates a method
for the obtainment of knowledge. Seeking to maintain favor with the Church but
seeing its epistemological inadequacies, Descartes articulates a procedure by
which certainty becomes possible, the famous cogito ergo sum being the result
of the application of this method. C larity and distinctiveness constitute the standard for rational thought, both of which provide a type of certainty modeled
after that found in mathematics (self-evidential, demonstrative proofs). For Descartes, one arrives at the foundations for philosophical truth by not adhering to
"appetites" or "teachers" but by starting from a position of skepticism and
doubt. 9
Similarly, Kant's answer to the question " What is the Enlightenment?" is:
"man 's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability
to use one 's understanding without guidance from another." He continues,
"Have courage to use your own understanding! " 1 For Kant's enlightened autonomous subject, dogmatism and inclination are improper sources for knowledge
(this extends beyond moral knowledge as well). Along these lines, his Critique
ofPure Reason outlines the various aspects ofthe human mind that provide for a
possible transcendental basis for experience (this will be crucial for Vasconcelos's criticism). Although for him reason is not strictly confmed to the human
realm, since Angels and God also possess it, Kant never ceases to place humanity's highest achievements alongside of a strict rational nature. In "Speculative
Beginnings of Human History," he writes, "mankind's earliest history reveals
that its exit from that paradise that reason represents as the fi!St dwelling place
of its species was nothing but the transition from the raw state of a merely animal creature to humanity, from the harness of the instincts to the guidance of
reason-in a word from the guardianship of nature to the state of freedom." 11 It
is the latin American positivists, as I will show below, who expand this notion
of freedom and take it to imply institutional reform.
I would like to draw attention to the dismissal of the senses as a source for
certainty within Descartes ideas and the rejection of inclination and heteronomy
in Kant's philosophy. In establishing these novel foundations for knowledge,
these philosophers parallel their two scientific counterparts, Galileo Galilei and
Isaac Newton, both of whom broke with dogma to pursue a science founded on
laws of reason generated by observation. For Descartes and Kant, metaphysics
and epistemology could not be furthered unless built upon the vantage point of
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individuals who can objectify their subject matter and establish fact. These facts
allow for the fonnulation of rational principles and objective knowledge- the
type of knowledge any person can access using the proper prooedure or method.
The focus on method creates a type of knowledge that makes sense to a particular person, i.e. modem man. The rejection of the senses and inclination thus anticipates the dismissal of human values and feelings (which will be crucial for
Locke's critique).
It is within the work of the French philosopher August Comte that human
reason as the establisher of fact becomes most apparent. Comte considered
Francis Bacon to be an individual of high-esteem since the latter argued that
''there can be no real knowledge except that which rests upon observed facts."
Comte continues, "This fundamental maxim is evidently indisgutable if it is
applied, as it ought to be, to the mature state of our intelligence." 2 Comte's central idea is that of "positive philosophy," the full constitution of which began
with Bacon, Descartes and Galileo, all of whom broke with the dogmatic, ·theocratic and superstitious impositions of scholasticism while trying to provide alternative (better) accounts for natural phenomena through the use of reason, argumentation and fact. 13 Comte's philosophy is indebted to Kant's system given
that the fonner accepts the latter's opinions about the true nature of things. Put
differently, Comte concerns himself with attempting to explain and describe
observable phenomena, putting aside the question of whether or not this explains
14
"things-in-themselves."
Positive philosophy consists of a three-fold stage of human history. Writing
at the height of human development, or so he believed, Comte argues that no
idea can be understood outside of the history of it; one must study the human
15
mind in a developmental manner, paying attention to its historical growth. The
necessary starting point is the theological stage, the "simplest." The main concerns of this stage are the inner nature of beings and the final cause (telos) of
observed phenomena. Here, supernatural agents (gods or deities) are said to interact with the world causing these phenomena. The metaphysical stage, the
second, is a transitional period where the workings of the world are credited to
abstract forces rather than the gods; " nature" or "mind" take the place of"God."
The third stage is the scientific or positive stage, the fixed and defmitive state of
the human mind. This stage abandons the idea of ultimate causes or final ends
and attempts to discover the actual laws of phenomena through the use of reason
and observation. Here, the positivist concerns herself with the explanation of
fact: the explanation of the relationships between different verifiable actions and
events (in short phenomena) that have taken place. 16 Comte writes, "we do not
pretend to explain the real causes of phenomena ... we try only to analyze correctly the circumstances of their production, and to connect them by nonnal re17
lations of succession and similarity."
Although most advances in positive science had taken place in the natural
sciences, little to nothing was done in the social sciences during Comte's time
(he called this "social physics"). For him, a social science would complete the
system of natural science by formulating laws about the working of human so-
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cial relations- this goal gains Comte the title ''the father of sociology." Comte
thought that human social networks and the political institutions that house these
are based on ideals and beliefs. Solidifying the bases for these beliefs is the job
of the positivist. Charles Frankel writes, "Comte's controlling assumption was
that institutions rest on morals, and that a stable morality rests on the general
acceptance of a unified and stable body of beliefs." 11 History proves important
in this framework because of its explanatory power in regards to the most current social conditions: they are a product of past human affairs. At the same
time, the future takes on new meaning given that improving the foundational
beliefs of a society can affectively change human institutions and morality. As
the Latin American positivist, Jose Victorino Lastarria, reminds, changing foundational beliefs requires a certain type of will power: "human events are natural
phenomena linked to each other and dependent upon human action and wil1." 19
Thus, out of Comte's social philosophy emerges a proto-sociaJ Darwinism. This
point of view renders morality, values and beliefs as functional products of human social relations at the disposal of those wishing to manipulate (improve)
human life.
By arriving at the proper understanding of humanity and fonnulating laws
to decipher the principles that govern sociaJ life, the positivists free themselves
from the servitude of mental immaturity. There is a liberating quality accompanying the realization of positive law since it allows for the proper understanding
of the human condition, making positive action or "progress" possible. Gabino
Barreda, a liberal advocate for positivism in Mexico, articulates the freeing effects of positivism and the need for order in the following manner: "Liberty is
commonly represented as a faculty of doing or seeking anything whatsoever
without subjection to law or to any force which might direct it; if such a freedom
could be achieved, it would be immoral and absurd because it would make all
discipline and, consequently, all order, impossible." He continues, "Far from
being incompatible with order, liberty consists, in all phenomena, both inorganic
and organic, in submitting fully to the laws which detennine those phenomena."20 Barreda' s notion of limited freedom, not to mention the social Darwinism
later attached to this perspective, prefigures the ways in which Latin American
positivists submitted to despotic rule.
In Latin America, given the history of colonialism, forced Scholasticism
and poverty, positivism offered a means by which order and progress could be
achieved. Rather than debate the true causes of the impoverished and subjugated
Latin American condition, ninetenth century positivists embraced instirutional
refonn (social order) and scientific education (the progress of knowledge) as the
best way to change their circumstances. Notice how this parallels Comte' s acceptance of Kant' s bifurcated metaphysics and then the move to a more practical
social philosophy concerned only with verifiable phenomena. Comparing themselves to modem European culture and the "Colossus to the North" (the United
States), many Latin American thinkers enacted public reforms promoting prac-
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tical education as a means rectifYing the perceived inferiority of Latin American
21
people. Justo Sierra, the great Mexican educator, furthered these ideals by adding to them Darwin's theory of survival of the fittest; he also demanded industrial development as a means of economic strengthening.22 Besides creating the
policies permitting the two-decade long dictatorship of Porfirio Dfaz (causes of
the 1910 Revolution), this opened up Mexico to neo-colonial interests that
quickly monopolized natural resources and national infrastructures. This bad
drastic consequences for the poor, the sick and people of indigenous culture who
were deemed as slowing down the advancement of Mexican (and Latin American) society.
In Latin America, positivism eliminated metaphysical, religious and nonfactual aspects of human thought from philosophical conversations; they were
not based on principles derived from empirical and rationalist science nor would
they resolve any of the problems of the region. Vasconcelos's philosophy is a
return to metaphysical, aesthetical and ethical analyses in order to provide for a
more comprehensive philosophy of life that is reflective of the cosmos. However, a£ Risieri Frondizi reminds, after positivism all theory wades in the wake of
practice (a wake that has left ripples in all of Latin American philosophy). 23
Thus, Vasconcelos critiques the idea of social progress for the sake of moral,
aesthetic and spiritual progress- a point that hints to his role as a philosophical
anthropologist. Like Locke who held a high appreciation for art and culture,
Vasconcelos demonstrated a similar disposition in providing the initial funds
used to sponsor Mexican muralists such as Diego Rivera and David Alfaro Siqueiros. Given that humans are endowed with a mind that leans towards the
more beautiful things in life, aesthetics was a subject of great importance to him.
However, Vasconcelos also appreciated aesthetics since it helps to express what
civilizations find meaningful in the world. Rationality is thus only one component to human search for meaning.
Locke's ideas likewise argue against the legacy of reason-based fact-driven
philosophy that dismisses the importance of value in human knowledge. In addition, he takes on a type of social philosophy that attempts to naturalize human
differences on racial grounds.24 Specifically, Locke's criticisms develop as a
response to eugenics, racial determinism and the science of racist biology, all of
which incorporate developmental and essentialist attitudes about human beings.
Taking anthropological science on its own terms, Locke suggests that the criteria
for racial classification are "arbitrary." 25 The facts about race, then, are uncertain and not self-evident. Moreover, the "value" driving this field was a depreciation of diversity and a desire to keep humanity separated on cultural and racial
levels.26 Locke continues his criticism ofthe scientific dependence on facts in a
more forceful manner by challenging the idea that facts can be derived independent of value at all. According to Locke all facts are derived from values; the
latter he understood to be grounded in human feelings, thus his famous claim,
"humans are indeed rational, they are emotional first" -a point that resonates
with the philosophy of Vasconcelos.
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Together, Locke and Vasconcelos explore what are sometimes called the
"non-rational" aspects of human thought. Their ideas, however, do not establish
mere epistemologies of feelings nor do they completely disregard human rationality. In this both thinkers come close to William James's thoughts in "The
Sentiment of Rationality." There, James argues that what we recognize as rationality consists of a set of feelings that mark something as sensible. Trying to
describe the experiential or phenomenological aspects of rationality, James
writes that it is Like "a strong feeling of ease, peace, [and] rest" in addition to the
transition from a feeling of perplexity and stress to relief and pleasure.27 While
Locke extends this very thought in h is own work on values and the feelingqualities that support them, Vasconcelos creates an epistemology that requires
the type of fluctuations in character and feeling which James describes above.
For these two thinkers the subjective elements of experience should not be discounted or obviated from the pursuit of knowledge due to any lack of objectivity-in fact, as Locke maintains, objectivity is only possible given these differences.

The Diversity of the Human Experience: Locke's Critical
Value Relativism
All philosophies, it seems to me, are in ultimate derivation philosophies of life
and not of abstract, disembodied 'objective' reality: products of time, place and
situation, and thus systems oftimed history rather than timeless etemity.21
Locke, Values and Imperatives
In his book Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Kwame Anthony
Appiah argues that respecting the differences between cultures while also recognizing the common humanity of all people is crucial to navigating through the
turmoil embedded in current world affairs and social relations. Appiah considers
this respect and recognition part of the "cosmopolitan attitude," a nonhierarchical way of viewing human differences that promotes tolerance and universality. Upon reflection, however, the line between cosmopolitan ethics and
ethical relativity is hard to identify, especially when one must respect the torture
of innocents or female circumcision (his examples). For Appiah, true cosmopolitans discuss moral differences in the hopes of enlightening a person or people.
Besides potentially violating the cosmopolitan ideal of respecting local autonomy-since one is seeking to disabuse a morally suspect view on behalf of responsibilities that all humans supposedly owe one another- it is often the case
that when ethics are in debate some people simply think they are rifht. Ultimately, Appiah 's text revolves around the question of value relativism. 2
While it is an empirical matter to purport that values are relative to cultures
and even persons, how to make normative judgments or critique particular ac-
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tions given this fact remains a question. This problematic can be explained as
the possibility of justifying values (or ethical behavior) without reference to metaphysical absolutes or universal ontological presuppositions.30 In anticipation of
this intellectual trend, Locke was correct in thinking that "the gravest problem of
contemporary philosophy is how to ground some normative principle or criterion of objective validity for values without resort to dogmatism and absolutism
... intolerance and mass coercion." This dilemma is worsened when one remembers, as Locke points out, that "common man .. . sets up personal ... [,]
private and group norms as standards and principles, and rightly or wrongly,
hypostasizes [sic] them as universals for all conditions, all times and all men." 31
In short, Locke has an answer to the dilemma that Appiah never resolves.
Rather than an objectivist position (which places values out in the world, often
along metaphysical bases) or a strict subjectivist view (which reduces values to
matters of taste or personal desire) Locke sought to establish a middle ground
between subjectivism and objectivism, between universalism and relativismbetween heaven and hell, some might say. Locke did not agree with the way that
American philosophers like William James or John Dewey considered values,
ideas and beliefs as the mere by-products of human interaction with the world.32
Although these philosophers considered emotions and feelings in their axiological work, Locke held that "they placed too much emphasis on consequences and
not enough on preferences and attitudes." 33 He writes, "Human behavior . . . is
experimental, but it is also selectively preferential, and not always in terms of
outer adjustments and concrete results. Value reactions guided by emotional
preferences and affinities are as potent in the determination of attitudes as pragmatic consequences are in the determination ofactions."34 In this sense, Locke's
understanding of values focused on innate psychological and emotional preferences that shape the process of valuation. Note that at times Locke does think
that a cautious empirical science, aware of its limitations and inability to provide
complete value-neutral facts, could create a type of universalism. However,
Locke is clear that a variety of ways of life have to be referenced since the values at the heart of this cautious empiricism would be functional universals, i.e.
those common values derived from human interactions with the world. 3 ~
Locke' s axiology accounts for values from a functional, psychological and
phenomenological perspective. What appear to be value absolutes or universals
derive their normative character from "feeling-references" and "value-modes."
These arise in response to stimuli that affect humans in certain ways, generating
visceral reactions that captivate an individual. Values are emergent qualities of
experience typified by rational decisions; they are ways of responding to the
world that rely on human emotion and feeling-based orientations. Prior to general evaluative judgments-<;onsiderations about whether something is "good" or
"bad," "right" or "wrong," etc.-four fundamental feeling-qualities are referenced (exaltation, tension, acceptance or agreement, and repose or equilibrium).
These pre-rational feeling-qualities designate "value modes" which assign a
range of possible patterns of valuation. As Ernest D. Mason explains, "Locke
has in mind the quality or essential nature of the value in question, that is,
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whether or not a value is construed to be ethical, aesthetic, religious, economic,
etc." 36 These in tum determine the range predicates utilized to express how an
object affects a person-the secondary act of evaluation, i.e. the expression of a
value. The role of human rationality in this process, if there is one at all, is the
attempt to make sense of how we feel in response to some phenomena, object or
situation. Again, this is a view of rationality similar to that advocated by James
(as explained above). To become consciously aware of a "value" requires reflection upon an affective process already underway. This is a phenomenological
point that stresses how our rational evaluative judgments only secondarily engage a dialogue between our body and viscera] reactions to stimuli. 37
Locke makes the following epistemological point: while the substance of
values is unfixed, since values can differ between humans and change over time,
the process of valuation is a general humarn phenomenon determined by the
workings of human psychology itself. No matter how influential social or natural surroundings may be in the creation or passing on of values, there will be
significant influence arising out of human psychology. This makes objective
value experiences possible in the same manner that Kant's categories of the
mind (in addition to space and time) create the possibility for the objective organization of experience. Johnny Washington writes, "Kant postulated the
twelve categories of the mind, together with the formal conditions of space and
time, to explain the conditions under which we organize our experience, in accordance with these a priori forms. Similarly, Locke postulated the four categories of feelinfs largely to expla.in the ways in which we organize our valuing
experience."3 Locke writes, "The basic qualities of values should never have
been sought in logical classes, for they pertain to psychological categories. They
are not grounded in types of realms of value, but are rooted in modes or kinds of
valuing." He continues, "the value-mode establishes for itself, directly through
feeling, a qualitative category which, as discriminated by its appropriate feelingquality, constitutes an emotionally mediated form of experience."39
Learning how to respond to our feeling-references and value modes can be
taught or conditioned by lived experience or even cultural traditions. Given that
the actual production of "values" (i.e. how we form axiological expressions of
our feelings) is a result of social conditioning and individual experience, we
learn how to value through culture_4° Cultures, in this sense, are patterns of valuation that are consistent across groups of people-note that they are in no way
static or unanimous. This is in part why a legitimate science of human value is
possible only by referencing various cultural groups.4 1 For instance, since all
humans adhere to the same set of feeling-references when caught in the process
of valuation (though end-values differ), certain environmental and social scenarios engender predominant feelings that express fundamental human values.
These are times when value predicates ("good," "bad," "beautiful," "ugly," etc.)
are blatantly obvious and causally linked to the types of feelings they fomentthough Locke is not advocating any sort of value essentialism, he just thinks that
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as humans it is not impossible that we share similar responses to things. Locke
refers to these as "cultural cognates," cross-cultural values that can only be empirically determined by engaging with other ways of life.
Locke argues that there are two roles relativism plays in this refined science
of value : (I) relativistic philosophy curtails the arbitrary passion for unity and
conformity, and (2) relativism helps to promote peace in that various points of
view are to be respected.42 Relativism provides these by not abandoning individual loyalties to traditions but promoting those loyalties in a certain way!3
Locke's nuanced notion of relativism is nonhierarchical and attempts to foster a
sense of commonalty amongst people by reminding all of their individual biases
and connections to their culture.44 Once people see that relativism leads to tolerance and respect while dogmatism leads to what Locke calls secular disunity,
"ideological peace" becomes more apparent•s ln addition, value disagreements
are not only expected but also desired. Calling this view "critical relativism,"
Locke implies that diversity in thought (i.e. how we use our rational abilities to
make sense of innate dispositional attitudes), diversity in values (amidst cultural
cognates) and diversity in ways of responding to environmental factors (both
social and natural) lead to a variety of possible expressions of human life, none
of which is better than another but equally representative of the human condition.
Values are thus derived from the same basic reality though they reflect
modes of experience that are "particularized expressions" of an ongoing relationship with the world. They should not be totalized and their concrete formulations should reflect an individual's engagement with the world!6 He writes that
"there is little sense and less need to set facts and values over against each other
as antagonistic orders; rather should we [sic] think of reality as a central fact and
a white light broken up by the prism of humans nature in a spectrum of values.',.7 Although for Locke this is meant as a metaphor on the human condition,
it in many ways describes the metaphysics that Vasconcelos has in mind.

A Mestizo Nondualism: Vasconcelos's Formulation oftbe
One and the Many
The job of the philosopher is to organize, with partial truths, a concurrent and
single system, capable of insertion into life, in an interior and essential way. To
achieve such unity abstraction [alone) does not suffice [no basta) nor is it legitimate either to pretend to not know of generalizations and abstractions; one
needs to combine all of the ways of knowing: the rational, the sensual, the emotional, the transcendental; all of the bound disciplines of knowledge conform to
hierarchies and affinities whose discovery and creation is precisely the specific
work of the philosopher.
Vasconcelos, Treatise on Metaphysics41
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In History of Philosophy in Mexico, Samuel Ramos argues that Vasconcelos's
system is the work of an imaginative individual. Admitting that there are many
truths lurking inside of Vasconcelos's corpus, Ramos believes that when reading
his work one gets the feeling that they are in the grips of a poet or artist rather
than a philosopher.49 This bas led many, including John Haddox, to write, "Vasconcelos is truly a poet with a system."50 There are few individuals as complex
and controversial as Vasconcelos. His philosophy depends upon the reconciling
of differences, the overcoming of heterogeneity. Although deceased for almost a
half century, scholars are still trying to make sense of Vasconcelos' s own life of
contradictions. Loved, bated, res~ected and scorned, he Jives on in the conversations and minds of many people. 1 For various reasons, this section will focus on
Vasconcelos's metaphysics and social theory, two areas that sometimes force an
engagement with controversy, i.e. his appeal to Western standards of beauty and
his " bourgeois mestizaje."
Vasconcelos was a member of the Ateneo de Ia Juventud ("The Youth Forum"), a group of intellectuals critical of the positive philosophy of Mexico and
the Diaz regime. As Luis A. Marentes writes about the philosophers of the Ateneo, "Theirs was a spiritual and aesthetic quest for a value system beyond the
pragmatic and crass materialism of the cientifico elite, which justified its privileged position on a social Darwinist belief in the survival of the fittest ." 52
Another important member of the Ateneo was the "anti-rationalist" Antonio Caso, who, like Vasconcelos, was influenced by the "vitalism" of the French philosophers Henry Bergson.53 Bergson held that a strict naturalist account of evolution was inadequate in explaining the fact that species mutation seems to be
moving in a definitive ("telic") direction. However, "definitive" is not meant to
express a fatal ist point of view nor are organisms simply the product of the interplay between genes and environment. Life is a representation of the elan vital,
the vital impetus. The elan vital is an unyielding process of becoming that favors
complexity and novelty over devolutionary processes or stagnating simplicity.
Life overcomes the possibility for the downward unpredictability of evolution
through "appetency" or a~ of desire which creates a future certain to be more
complex yet undetermined. Appetency is the source for Vasconcelos 's take on
emotion, desire, beauty and Jove.
According to Haddox, if there is a word that can be used to describe Vasconcelos's entire philosophical project it is "living."55 Vasconcelos considered
life to be the dynamic interplay of heterogeneous parts that ultimately boil to
electromagnetic forces. Life, in this sense, could not be captured by an epistemology aspiring towards objective, unchanging truth; the world is alive and both
rational and non-rational, human ways of knowing must respond in like. Fittingly, Vasconcelos provides an epistemology that corresponds to an understanding
of the world as in flux. Since the human spirit desires to freely know the world,
without utilitarian, calculative and manipulative intentions, an adequate way of
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knowing is needed to bring about "the cosmic age." He called this view the aesthetic monism.
Vasconcelos's metaphysics is rather convoluted: a non-dualist idealism that
holds reality to be comprised of several levels that ultimately reveal a rich
rhythmic radiant energy. The ftrSt level is comprised of atoms and subatomic
waves. The electromagnetic variations and forces found here are sometimes expressed as " light" or "energy." The second stage is that of "coordinated heterogeneity." This stage consists of compounds or elements that are the combination
and continuance of differing atomic particles. The third stage is that of the living
cell that unites along asymmetrical bases to create animal species and plant life.
The highest level of development here is the human being. This is because humans have consciousness, a "living act that permits it to coordinate the different
elements of lcnowledge that come to one through the various instruments of
knowledge." Vasconcelos continues by noting that these elements are "the
senses, intelligence, will and feeling." Human spiritual and intellectual progress
is necessary in this framework given that it is meant to "realize" this world-this
spiritual advancement engenders a new level of reality (the fourth stage).S6
To account for the fa~ade of distinction is the job of the philosopher, especially the philosopher concerned with coordination, i.e. the interplay and interrelatedness of various aspects of life. Seeing how reality is essentially a rhythmic
pulse of energy, Vasconcelos's aesthetic monism attempts to refme the aesthetical qualities needed for such a project. He writes, "All that is life in the world is
constructed esthetically, artistically." Vasconcelos continues, "the thesis of the
esthetic a priori ... consists in maintaining that just as the mind has categories
of space-time, of genus and species, it is also endowed with special forms of
understanding applicable to the esthetic phenomenon, forms which clarify beauty, and these forms are rhythm, melody and harmony."s7 Not only are human
beings drawn towards objects of beauty, which is to say we prefer aesthetically
pleasing things to displeasing ones, but we are endowed with instruments that
help us to find beauty in the world- in a nominal sense, humans articulate
"beautiful" relationships between heterogeneous objects that do not exist without human realization. These are acts of creation.
According to Vasconcelos, traditional Western metaphysical theories passively try to discover the workings of reality by concerning themselves with the
instruments of reason. When claims about reality are made they often reduce
everything to abstractions or principles. These "generalizations," as Vasconcelos
calls them, C·onfme any positive claim to the realm of reason and the intellect by
assuming facets of rationality to be the apriori bases for knowledge. Vasconcelos thought that this would never amount to truth (or philosophy):
The main faculties of reason often found with the Cartesians do not arrive, and
never have arrived[,) at philosophyL] it stays in scientism. There are philosophical temperaments and anti-philosophical temperaments; the rational temperaments are anti-philosophical; Wisdom is gnosis [esoteric knowledge] and logos
[rationalizations]; the rationalists have always been stuck in the logos, and not
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even taken a peek at gnosis. It arrives at this with eyes that do not see, with an
intellect that no longer disassociates [disocia] but that identifies.51

The emotions and aesthetic principles of life are the esoteric. They are the
mystical aspects of human life that force an engagement with subjectivity. Human subjectivity is crucial because esoteric knowledge (gnosis) is revealed during individual experiences. These could be such things as pre-rational encounters with the sublime or other metaphysical elements that cannot rationally really
be explained. It is worth noting that this type of knowledge and experience
uphold the process of synthesis, while rational orderings (logos) serves as the
basis for the process of analysis--something Vasconcelos does not want to discount.
For Vasconcelos the human mind consists of two main metal processes: ( I)
the ability to separate, analyze and distinguish (analysis or distinction), and (2)
integration or re-unification, the more difficult since it relies upon creativity and
the gathering of meaning (synthesis). Heterogeneity is central because when two
things of differing composition are synthesized they create something new.
Conversely, when two things of the same composition synthesize nothing new is
created; there is no reconciliation. The word "disassociation" in the last line of
the above quote is crucial because the process of "identification" does not provide knowledge but relies upon the principle of identity (where "a=a" is the
standard for identity). Identification attempts to find what it already knows. To
disassociate, however, is to draw a distinction where there was none before, it
requires activity and not the mere verification of previously figured principles
whose predictive success and explanatory power are being tested. The idea of
race serves as an example of these processes: The pseudo-anthropological
science of the late ninteenthth century divided humans into groups based on
physical and cultural differences (analysis). What reunites humans after this
division will be "synthetic," it deals with parts comprised of different groups. As
hinted at by this example, Vasconcelos thought that the process of synthesis, as
an epistemological tool used in the realization of the cosmos, also needed to be
enacted on a cultural or racial level. Vasconcelos calls this the process of mestizaje.
In contrast with people like Arthur de Gobineau who thought that racial
mixing and racial inequality were factors that played into the development and
decadence of a civilization, Vasconcelos's Raza Cosmica articulates a philosophy of race based on mestizaje.s9 While exclusive assimilative ideals, such as
the United States melting-pot, purport to incorporate different groups into a preestablished collective, mestizaje requires reciprocity and variety, both leading to
novelty. Mestizaje is a more nuanced understanding of"race mixing"-this idea
is not just about miscegenation but cultural and custom-based fusion .60 Let me
note, however, that Vasconcelos believes in a bourgeois mestizaje, a "mestizaje
from above" used by individuals seeking to implement social change during
times of nation-building. In this sense, when heroes of mestizaje such as Vas-
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concelos employ the idea of a coming racial synthesis (it is always off in the
distance, which pennits the status-quo to remain) they note the whitening or
Eurocentric demand and expectation for indigenous confonnity. It pays lip service to the dead Indian while ignoring the Indian in front of their eyes. This has
been the source of much criticism by indigenous advocates in Latin America.6 1
Building on the interconnectivity that the Anglo tradition has provided (i.e.
globalization), the cosmic race can only come about if Latin American culture
can create the spiritual basis for human progress. To reawaken this mission is
what Vasconcelos seeks to do. He writes, "Only a leap of the spirit, nourished
with facts, can give us a vision that will lift us above the micro-ideology of the
specialist. Then we can dive deeply into the mass of events in order to discover a
direction, a rhythm, and a purpose. Precisely there, where the analyst discovers
nothing, the synthesizer and creator are enlightened.'t62 Vasconcelos is "prophetic" in the sense that he reminds the Latin people of the mission that fate has bestowed upon them: to create the "synthetical race, the integral race, made up of
the genius and the blood of all people and, for that reason, more capable of true
brotherhood and of a truly universal vision."63 In other words, the bringing about
of the fourth stage of reality depends upon the blending of races (I will say more
about how Locke can help resolve some of the issues that remain within Vasconcelos's race theory in the next section).
Responding against the idea that reason alone is the focal point of the human mind, Vasconcelos writes,
The job of the philosopher is to organize, with partial truths, a concurrent and
single system, capable of insertion into life, in an interior and essential way. To
achieve such unity abstraction [alone] does not suffice [no basta] nor is it legitimate either to pretend to not know of generalizations and abstractions; one
needs to combine all of the ways ofknowing: the rational, the sensual, the emotional, the transcendental; all of the bound disciplines of knowledge conform to
hierarchies and affinities whose discovery and creation is precisely the specific
work of the philosopher.64
The abstractions (principles or generalities) derived using reason are crucial
to understanding the universe. However, a strict emphasis on reason alone, "logocentrism," inadequately deals with the human being since emotions are just as
influential in our daily affairs as is intellect, especially those emotions connected
to beauty. In this sense the cosmic age requires the cosmic way of thinking: aesthetic monism.

Towards a Holistic American Consciousness
This section concludes this essay by presenting the social implications of the
epistemological critiques provided by Locke and Vasconcelos. I show what effect these criticisms have on the ideas of progress, culture and race, in addition
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to demonstrating some possible ways of viewing Locke's axiology in light of his
racial theory.
Locke's epistemological work attempts to detennine the nature of values in
the hopes of productively accounting for them in human life. The consequences
of this pursuit are of the utmost importance. As Leonard Harris notes, if values
tum out to be "metaphysical in character, then it would tell us the way values
cohere or were constituted like the nature of the universe. If anthropological ...
the general theory would tell us the way values cohere or constitute a foundational feature of our personhood.'t6$ Likewise, a broad consideration of values
would illuminate what is of real importance to human life while also demonstrating the practicaJities and actions needed to support, enhance or realize those
nonnative ideals.66 Values being the source for anything of real existential and
axiological importance in life, discounting values as a mere subjective element
of experience where no truth can be gained is a disservice to humanity. Acknowledging values yet ignoring the plurality of them results in much of the
same.
Vasconcelos believed that humans are endowed with a desire to find beauty
in the world. Human intellect is intertwined with the nature of reality since humans are endowed with the capabilities of consciously realizing and understanding it. The cosmos being non-rational and rational, human ways of knowing
must respond in like. Focused on the further development of one kind of knowledge, modem philosophical systems allowed for social theories that ignored the
axiological aspects of human life and created policies that rendered entire people
and ways of life as obstacles to progress. Influenced by an assortment of cultures
and intellectual traditions, Vasconcelos attempts to articulate holistic knowledge
of the world. Yet, in his confused racial biology Vasconcelos thinks that this
implies the actuaJ mixing of people. Thus, in his philosophy of race, especially
in La Raza C6smica, Vasconcelos maintains that a person's culture or way of
life can be detennined through race. As the anthropologist, Peter Wade, reminds, it is often the case that "racial thinking is not just about dividing people
into physical categories, but also about explaining their behavior.'t67
Put in this manner, race is a product of the naturalization of one's relationship to culture. Locke credits this idea to de Gobineau and the social evolutionism of Herbert Spencer. Similarly, he thought that the basis for this point of
view was the notion of a universal process of development as connected to a
stage-theory of human progress (which as Locke notes was already discredited
by his time).61 For Locke there is no causal link between race and culture outside
of historical contingency.69 1t is to the downfall of much anthropological science
that this linkage was never remedied.
One of the main factors that drove Locke towards this epistemological criti71
que is his work on race.10 Locke dissected "the facts" about racial biology.
Presented as the truth about human beings, the racialist biology of his day would
never permit African Americans and whites to live a peaceful coexistence as
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equals. Inequality was viewed as an essential aspect of human relations.72
Locke's philosophical corpus is an attempt to rectify a modem scientific
worldview that creates facts about human life that support domination and social
hierarchy. He sought to disabuse the scientific rationalist view by demonstrating
the ways in which certain axiomatic bases for human inquiry and knowledge rest
upon particular values stemming from " imperial cultures." Imperial cultures are
those that dominate the modus operandi of the political engagements that occur
when people of different backgrounds meet, often through threat of violence.73
As Nancy Fraser points out, Locke is a "critical theorist of society, specifically
of the history and political economy of racism." 74 Thus, one of the brilliant aspects of Locke's work is his consistent understanding of race as a heuristic for
social organization, social empowerment or cultural expression, in addition to it
also being a source for oppression and prejudice.
Locke saw "race" as a social mechanism that dictates the workings of social
7
interaction. s He argues that the social phenomena that race describes is very
old. The ideological importance now visible in the concept of "race," however,
sterns from the way it was used by modem European culture to dominate cultural and political interactions with people of other ways of life. In Race Contacts,
Locke ventures so far as to say that race was introduced during the modemcolonial period to justify acts of slavery and exploitation while curbing the ability for cultural groups to obtain the same social status as those who were in positions of power. In other words, "race" became the inheritable socio-economic
baggage of one' s ancestral lineage, functioning more along the lines of caste.
Nonetheless, as Locke argues, these economic and social differences became
"naturalized" when ways of life become fixed to phenotypical differences; cultures quickly becomes racialized in places where race serves as a guarantor of
one' s relationship to the modes of production and the consumption of "modem
culture" or " human civilization." This qualities modem European culture as
"imperial," seeing how this group was successful at dominating the political
terms for social interaction.76 As Stewart reminds, "Locke approached ra.c e as
Karl Marx had analyzed class-as the vortex of modem social relations."77
Regarding culture, Locke thought that this was an internal process that
flows from personality to personality, not objectively " in the best that has been
thought and created in the world," a Ia Matthew Amold. 71 Cultures are not homogenous static entities for Locke but complex and reflect the changing dispositions and attitudes of their members. "The self-administered part of one' s education," the process of becoming cultured is the obtainment or refmement of "the
capacity for understanding the best and most representative forms of human
expression, and of expressing oneself, if not in similar creativeness, at least in
appreciative reactions and in progressively responsive refinement of taste and
interests."79 Culture helps individuals understand who they are; learning to express oneself is an act of self-cultivation that requires social existence. Though
culture is appreciated personally, it is only through association with others that
culture is possible in the ftrSt place, which is why it pertains to the shared histories and patterns of valuation that people have in common. Being true to one's
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culture, then, is a way of being true to oneself (the significance of this is extremely important given Locke psychological theory of value). This does not
mean that culture determines humans, if anything we are in constant dialogue
with our culture, allowing it to shape us and us to shape it
Hegel makes a similar point in The Phenomenology of Spirit. While explaining the further development of "self-consciousness," Hegel holds that the
world of culture (Bildung) is one where existence and actuality derive from a
process by which an individual"divests itself of its personality, thereby creating
its world." He continues, " It is therefore through culture that the individual acquires standing and actuality." 10 Bildung is the act of cultivation, the refinement
of certain qualities and traits that places one in unison with the shared meanings
and interpretive practices of their social, intellectual, aesthetical and moral surroundings. Bildung thus pertains to the normative shared ideal of a group. Coming into terms with the epistemic criteria established by modem epistemology
was to "develop" or become "cultured" in a specific European way. Remember,
as detailed above, the progress and advancement that modem philosophers were
concerned with had normative implications upon the nature of the scientific inquirer and led to developmental theories of human nature advocated by eugenicists, positivists and many anthropologists.
Human beings are thus representatives of culture.11 In an idea that parallels
Locke's views on how value-objectivity is possible, he and Stem suggest, "To
be properly understood, civilization should be studied in the setting of world
culture. Many of the current misconceptions in regard to culture and civilization
become apparent only after a consistent application of objective viewpoints resulting from the broadest possible comparison of all types of human culture."12
Vasconcelos, in thinking that all people are endowed with cultural aptitudes
correspondjng to race, maintains the racialist position. However, in some of his
latter work, Vasconcelos thinks that race corresponds to civilization-type, a civilization being the history of how a group learned to deal with their environment.
In a lecture delivered in Chicago (1926), Vasconcelos put forth the idea that
civilizations are ways of interpreting life. He writes, "we have before us the two
forms of civilization (the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin], the two manners of interpreting life, that we must try to combine in a brotherly manner if our purpose is
as it should be, to create in this hemisphere a new cycle ofhisto~-tbe cycle of
liberty, understanding, and love amongst all races and nations."1 As interpretations of life, civilizations are aesthetical processes that articulate and provide
meaning to human affairs. These meanings are preserved through values that
humans maintain. Aesthetics, as the search for meaning, especially philosophical
meaning, thus becomes an expression of human creativity. This means that humans creatively make sense of their particular existence as part of a larger collective (one's culture or even the cosmic worldview if you will). This necessitates a type of cultural authenticity (or first-person perspective) not to be found
in colonial social conditions that ignore the plurality of the human experience

The Axiological Turn

49

and instead forc.e a coercive worldview requiring homogeneity through forced
conformity and colonialism.
Locke's nuanced understanding of race can help the early Vasconcelos support this view. The ways of knowing and appreciating life that allow for the development of the "cosmic race" are not necessarily connected to particular cultures, but may very well correlate with the historical development of such
peoples. What is worth holding onto in Vasconcelos ' s view is the criticism of a
rationalist philosophy that promotes an engagement with the innate emotional
and aesthetical dispositions of human beings. Since all individuals and communities are connected to civilization (in the broadest sense possible), all are trying
to interpret life. In both views, that of Locke and Vasconcelos, true philosophico-anthropological "progress" takes a radical rethinking of the human mind and
a rethinking of the origins and uses of"human development."

Notes
In an essay on the pragmatism of Alain Locke, Nancy Fraser argues that Cornel
West's The American Evasion of Philosophy issues a challenge to proponents of American pragmatism by including the life and work ofW.E.B. DuBois as a part of the American philosophical canon. With this inclusion, not to mention those of a similar nature that
carne before it, contemporary pragmatists are asked to think not only about the work of
such figures as Peirce, James and Dewey, but also such issues as "the problem of the
color line." Nowadays, it is practically impossible to speak about the color line without
mentioning something about that line in the sand known as the U.S. border, an all-to-real
mark of identity for many Latino/as. Seeing how American philosophy tends to rely upon
a method which, drawing from Fraser again, social intelligence serves as the guide for
social practice, one of the important locales from where pragmatists should mine is the
rich history of philosophical thought provided by Latin Americans-this includes those
in the United States. It is in this light that I offer an essay on the work of Alain Locke and
Jose Vasconcelos. Again, here is to rethinking "American Philosophy." See Nancy Fraser, "Another Pragmatism: Alain Locke, Critical 'Race' Theory, and the Politics of Culture," in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locu: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics,
Community. Culture, Race, and Education, ed. Leonard Harris (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 3.
I. Though I cannot put the two together it is possible that in one of Vasconcelos's
extensive travels throughout the United States he might have run across Locke's work or
maybe the man himself. These travels are detailed in Jose Vasconcelos Obras Completas
(Mexico, DF: Libreros Mexicanos Unidos, 19S7-196 1) with no mention of Locke. I can
place Ralph Barton Perry (Locke's dissertation advisor at Harvard) and Vasconcelos at
The Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, though it was sometime after Locke
graduated. Nonetheless, there remains no evidence to suggest that they had any communication. For more on the interaction of Perry and Vasconcelos see "Second InterAmerican Congress of Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9:3
(March 1949), 34~26.
2. For a brief explanation of philosophical anthropology that hinges on the idea of
"plasticity" refer to Richard Schacht, " Philosophical Anthropology," in The Cambridge
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DictioNJry of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: University Press, 199.5), .580.581.
3. For more on Locke as a philosophical anthropologist see William B. Harvey,
"The Philosophical Anthropology of Alain Locke," in Alain Locke: Reflections On A
Modern ReNJissance Man, ed. Russell J. Linnemann (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1982). Philosophical anthropology was a topic of great importance in Latin
America at the end of the ninetenth and twentieth centuries (Vasconcelos's work is an
example of this). For an excellent and brief treatment of philosophical anthropology in
Latin America (with accompanying texts) see Jorge Gracia and Elizabeth MillAn-Zaibert,
Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2004),

75-87.
4. This is "science" as scientia: "systematic knowledge based on indubitable foundations." See the editorial note by John Cottingham in Rent Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings, ed. John Cottigham, Robert Stoothoof and Dugald Murdoch (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), I.
5. Proof of this attitude is apparent in the work of social contract theorists like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These individuals associate the
state of nature, the supposed initial social condition of human beings, with the Americas
and other colonial territories. While it is true that these thinkers question the reality of
such a time in human affairs, they nonetheless view indigenous people around the world
as evidence for such an idea
6. David Hume is a modem philosopher explicitly concerned with the passions,
senses, emotions and feelings, his famous line being. "Reason is, and ought to be the
slave of the passions." Hume does not, however, intend for this to undermine the importance of reason in his philosophy of action, especially insofar as moral reasoning is concerned. His point is that reason alone is insufficient for explaining morality (one could
add the same for the passions, i.e. reason is required). On this point he is similar to the
philosophers I am concerned with in this paper. The important distinction between Hume,
Locke and Vasconcelos, especially insofar as the emotions, senses and passions are concerned, is that the latter two do not believe the passions to be completely subjective since
(to borrow a terms from Locke) "dispositional-attitudes" do exists. These are subjective
tendencies or psychological states that humans objectively or categorically share, even
though they are not expressed in universal values.
7. For more on the material and colonial underpinnings allowing for " modernity"
see Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the AmerictU: The Eclipse of the Other and the
Myth of Modernity, ed. Michael D. Barbe.r (New York: Continuum. 1995).
8. See Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America (Malden: Blackwell, 200.5), 3444.
9. Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings, 13.
10. Immanuel Kant, " What is Enlightenment?" in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, ed. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 41 (emphasis in original).
II. Kant, "What is Enlightenment?," S3
12. Auguste Comte, Introduction to Positive Philosophy, ed. Frederick Ferrt (Indianapolis: Hacken, I 988), 4.
13. Comic, Introduction to Positive Philosophy, II .
14. Charles Frankel, "Positivism," in A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950), 331. On this level, Comte's
positivism appears to be a type of phenomenology given that his analysis of observable
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phenomena requires a bracketing of metaphysical debates about things-in-themselves or
" reality."
IS. Comte, Introduction to Positiw Philosophy, 1.
16. Comte, Introduction to Positive Philosophy, 2. Whereas both theological and
metaphysical stage arrived at their highest phase by aiming towards simplicity (either a
s ingle supernatural being or a single great general entity/force, i.e. nature), the pos itive
stage would end if it arri ved at a general fact, but this is unattainable argues Comte.
17. Comte, Introduction to Positiw Philosophy, 8.
18. Frankel, "Positivism," 329.
19. See Leopoldo Zea. The Latin-American Mind, eds. James H. Abbot and Lowell
Dunham (Norman: University of Oklahoma. 1963), 136.
20. Zea. The Latin-American Mind, 226.
2 1. Zea. The Latin-American Mind, 270.
22. Zea, The Latin-American Mind, 271.
23. See Ris ieri Frondiri, "Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?" Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 9:3 (March 1949): 3SS
24. See Jeffrey Stewart, "Introduction," Race Contacts and Interracial RelatioM, ed.
Jeffrey C. Stewart (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992), xxii. See also
Alain Locke, "The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture," Tire Philosophy of
Alain Loclce, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
2S. Ala in Locke, "The Problem of Race Classification," in The Philosophy of Alain
Loclce, 164.
26. The Mexican philosopher, Leopoldo Zea. relates this depreciation of diversity to
what Descartes says in the Discourse: " fnhere is not usually so much perfection in

works composed several parts and produced by various different craftsmen as in the
works of one man." See Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings, 12. Put more d irectly, Descartes's method turns ways from human diversity because of its inability to provide certainty. See Zea. Cuardernos Americanos: Filosofla de lo Americana (M~xico,
D.F.: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1984), 29. Zea is not alone with this idea: Isaiah Berlin
argues that Giambattista Vico's criticism of Descartes's project stems from the fact that
the vast differences one finds in humanity make it an impossible source for certainty. See
Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics oftire Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000).
27. William James, The Sentiment of Rationo/ity (New York: Longman, Gree.n s and
Co., I 90S), 63.
28. This line coincides with what is called the "culturaJist position" in the Latin
Am.e rican philosophical debate regarding philosophy as a universal science of thought or
a culturally based mode of inquiry. The culturalists, most notably Leopoldo Zea ( who
hi mself draws from the "perspectival ism" of Jose Ortega y Gasset), hold that philosophy
arises out of cultural or particular circumstance. See Gracia and MiiiAn-Zaibert, lAtin
American Philosophy for tire 2I st Century.
29. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers
(New York: Norton, 2006), 13.
30. Hilary Putnam's Ethics Without Ontology (2004) and The Many Faces of Realism ( 1987) are worth mentioning in this respect since Appiah draws from Putnam's d ismantling of the fact/value dichotomy (see Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 13-33). It is also
worth noting that even though his axiological work anticipates the major moves of Putnam' s argument. neither Appiah nor Putnam himself mention Locke. One can perhaps
credit this to the fact that Putnam is drawing from Dewey, although there remains some
debate about whether this is true for Locke. Locke's unpublished essay " Value," written
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sometime between 1935 and 1947, is an excellent place for comparison (See Locke, The
Philosophy of Alain Loclc~). Editors' Note: " Value" is type-written in Locke's arch ive,
however, it was published by Locke's advisor for his terminal thesis at Oxford in 1910, F.
C. S. Schiller, " Value" in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), 232- 233. The authorship is at least a
question, but the content is consistent with both Locke's and Schiller's view of values.
31. Locke, " Values and Imperatives," 36.
32. Locke, " Values and Imperatives," 35.
33. Johnny Washington, Alain Locke and Philosophy: A Quest for Cultural Pluralism (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986), 24.
34. Locke, " Values and Imperatives," 37.
35. Locke, " Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy," 53- 54.
36. Ernest Mason, "Alain Locke's Ph ilosophy of Value," in Alain Locke: Reflections
on a Modern Renaissance Man, ed. Russell J. Linnemann (Baton Rouge: Lo uisiana State
University, 1982), p. 4
37. Mason summarizes Locke's understanding of the process of valuation in the following way: "The distinction between the evaluational experience and the act of evaluation, or between the original value experience and the evaluation of that experience constitutes the core of Locke's theory of value. The original value sensing is always a direct
and immediate experience, and like all direct and immediate experiences, it is supposedly
noncognitve. An evaluative judgment, on the other hand, is clearly and intellectual act
that attempts to examine our original value experience to determine its worth. What this
means for Locke is simply that the existence of end-values is not necessarily mediated by
a process of evaluation or by a formal, logical value judgment. Instead, certain base feeling-attitudes normally condition these end-values prior to the intellectual act of formal
evaluation. Men, says Locke, are indeed rational, but they are first of all emotional." See
Mason, " Alain Locke's Philosophy of Value," 6.
38. See Washington, Alain Locke and Philosophy, 28. As Jacoby Carter reminds,
Loc.ke does not limit himself to j ust four categories of feelings. On a different note, the
difference between Kant and Locke is the way in which the latter does not seek to universalize the content of values, just the form or pattern of valuation. Insofar as I am concerned, this is what Kant is asking to do as well. Kant argues that we can know that the
form of moral claims will be universal, though the content might not be (one could be
willing something that fails the test of the categorical imperative). See Immanuel Kant
Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMorals, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994}, 26.
39. Locke, " Values and Imperatives," 38.
40. Judith Green, " Alain Locke's Multicultural Philosophy of Value," The Critical
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is through being the same and having the same values. For Locke this generates a paradox. Absolutists arrive at unity through universality. Universality requires orthodoxy,
which for Locke entails "authoritarian conformity and s ubordination." "Orthodoxy" is a
belief agreeing with conventional standards. Orthodoxy imposed through authoritarian
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